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ALEXANDER POPE AND THE LONGINIAN TRADITION  
OF THE SUBLIME 
Zoltán Cora
Respicit Aeneas subito et sub rupe sinistra
moenia lata videt triplici circumdata muro,
quae rapidus flammis ambit torrentibus amnis,
Tartareus Phlegethon, torquetque sonantia saxa.
Porta adversa ingens solidoque adamante columnae,
vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi exscindere bello
caelicolae valeant; stat ferrea turris ad auras […]
(Vergilius: Aeneis, VI, 548–555.)
In the context of early 18th-century British literary aesthetics, rhetoric and 
psychological interpretations of sublimity appear parallel, increasingly fo-
cusing on the affective potentials within the psychological mechanism of 
the sublime. On the one hand, this changing approach towards the sub-
lime developed according to early 18th-century British authors’ growing 
interest in sensibility and imagination. The original rhetoric category was 
widened towards a more empirical and psychological one. The reinterpre-
tation of Longinus’ Peri hypsous reinvigorated French and British classicist 
literary debates. At the same time, however, the new trend of reinterpreting 
the sublime was also a result of a selective rediscovery of the Longinian 
sublime and the reception of Lockean empiricism simultaneously. This pa-
per offers insights into how the literary aesthetic discourse on the sublime 
became genuinely heterogeneous by the 1740s, and how it was ‘prepared’ 
to be reassessed and recapitulated by Edmund Burke, presenting a scheme 
which served as the representation of the unity of terror, astonishment and 
joy on a deeper, half-subconscious level (sub-limen).
Moreover, the aim of this study is to also explore and examine some 
aspects of how Alexander Pope interpreted sublimity within the context 
of early 18th-century British literary aesthetics. It is worth discussing var-
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ious interpretations of the sublime in this period, because the first half of 
the 18th century witnessed the gradual transformation of the concept from 
its original, stricter, rhetoric interpretation towards a more imaginative 
and empiricist psychological aesthetic category. Within the realm of ear-
ly 18th-century British literary aesthetics, I investigated in an earlier paper 
how the early 18th-century concept of the sublime developed towards the 
aesthetic concept with the major source of terror in the theories of Burke 
and Kant with John Dennis as the hallmark of this change (Cora 2014). 
Dennis was one of the first among the British literary critics of this pe-
riod, who reinterpreted the rhetoric tradition of the Longinian sublime, 
and reconceptualised it by using the physico-theological theory of Thomas 
Burnet (Sacred Theory of Earth (1681)) (Cora 2014).
Although this process of transformation began with John Dennis in the 
early 18th century, this period still displays ambiguity in the interpretation 
of sublimity, namely, the above mentioned rhetoric and the empiricist-psy-
chological trends. Because Alexander Pope had a direct debate with Den-
nis on the merits of literary criticism, including the nature of sublimity, it 
is worth investigating Pope’s ideas on the sublime. Thus, one can also see 
the different facets of contemporary interpretations of sublimity.
My hypothesis is that Pope belongs to that group of critics who interpret 
the sublime as a rhetoric category which needs erudition and refined taste 
(the peripathetic tradition of the sublime), following the classical model 
of the urban sublime by Horace and Cicero (sublimitas urbana). The latter 
concept is based on the classicist notion of urbanitas (Ramage 1964: 390–
414).¹2Most of Pope’s contemporaries tended to shift the interpretation of 
the sublime towards a more empiricist and psychological basis. Yet, Pope 
belongs to that stream of literary aesthetics of neoclassicism, which springs 
from a wide spectrum of sensibility. This stream brings about heterogene-
ous interpretations of sublimity from finer ones derived from a crisp and 
grand style to those that spring from wild nature’s affective force of awe 
and terror. However, prior to discussing Pope’s critical theory, it is worth 
investigating the tradition of the sublime in neoclassicist literary aesthetics.
The paper also hypothesises that while the enthusiastic and passionate 
aspects of the sublime originate not only from 18th-century philosophy, 
1  For further examples of the parallels between the satirisation of Pope and Horace, see Sanders 
(1996), 280–285.
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but rather from Greek peripathetic rhetorical theory and Platonic philoso-
phy, yet the ontological and psychological significance of terror in the sub-
lime becomes elaborated only in the 18th century. As for the structure of 
the paper, a short philosophical investigation on how various postmodern 
thinkers, first of all, Jean-François Lyotard, Hans Bertens and Guy Sircel-
lo, rephrased the problem of the sublime is followed by a longer section, 
in which I elaborate on how the Burkean and the Kantian sublime can be 
reinterpreted from the perspective of the Longinian tradition. Finally, the 
question is investigated of how the sublime can be hypothesised as an af-
fective source for human insights, both rhetorically and empirically in the 
early 18th century.
Some poststructuralist aesthetic theories about the sublime appear as 
fashionable concepts with three well-identifiable critical points. First, ac-
cording to Guy Sircello, the epistemological transcendence means that im-
agination overpowers cognition in sensing the sublime. Thus, thinking is 
disabled, therefore, creating a theory of the sublime is impossible, because 
theoretical working-out necessarily relies on cognition, which is in this case 
overwritten by excess imagination (Sircello 1993). Secondly, the notion of 
ontological transcendence refers to the fact that the sublime has its effects 
on human beings, thus, it exists, if only in an unreachable way, as a con-
sequence of the former transcendence (Sircello 1993: 542–550). Whereas, 
finally, according to the poststructuralist critic, Jean-François Lyotard, the 
concept of radical openness in general implies that the sublime presents the 
unpresentable: the lack of the validity of reality yields an invention of oth-
er realities (Lyotard 1993: 109–133), as also pointed out by Hans Bertens:
an art of negation, a perpetual negation […] based on a 
neverending critique of representation that should con-
tribute to the preservation of heterogeneity, of optimal 
dissensus […] [it] does not lead towards a resolution; the 
confrontation with the unpresentable leads to radical 
openness (Bertens 2005: 128).
Although postmodernism revisits this basic ontological question with a 
critical theoretical refinement and builds it into its terminology (Bertens 
2005: 126–128), I do not think it produces any fundamentally new per-
spectives or interpretations of the sublime. Because the very tradition — in 
the form postmodern critical thinkers refer to them — that began with 
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Longinus and continued much later with Kant, in itself carries this contra-
diction between the eidetic and ontic aspects of the sublime. In addition, if 
this aesthetic and philosophic tradition is reconsidered, Hans Bertens’ con-
clusion of an emerging “radical openness” acquires a more complex mean-
ing.
Authors of classical antiquity interpreted the sublime in a rhetorical-for-
mal way with its final intention of exciting delight and affection in the 
audience of the orator. The genus sublime, also known as the genus grande, 
was the strongest among the three basic rhetorical modes (genus tenue, 
mediocre et grande), and it united a large variety of rhetorical elements. 
Though many authors can be pinpointed as significant within this rhe-
torical tradition, for our discussion, it is Longinus, or occasionally called 
Pseudo-Longinus, who in his work, entitled Peri hypsous (On the Sublime), 
united these rhetoric features and inevitably stands as the very source of 
the modern tradition of the sublime (for the questions of authorship and 
dating, see Adamik 1998: 169–172; Nagy 1935: 363–378; “Pseudo-Longi-
nus” 2001: 513–514;  Kennedy 1997: 306; Russell 1965: x–xi; Russell 1981: 
72–73; Longinus 1991: xvii–xxi). Albeit his person is much debated, yet he 
most probably lived in Rome in 1st century A.D. In that period the capital 
city of the Roman Empire was the centre of elitist classicism and ‘Greek 
renaissance’ within Latin culture that implied emulation and confronta-
tion with the Greek tradition (Kennedy 1997: 307–308). It is this vivid 
and exuberant context that inspired Longinus, the Greek philologist, to 
write his treatise on a topic which had been taken up by numerous authors 
in the previous centuries, including Theophrastos, Cornificius, Cicero, or 
Horace.
Longinus conceived the sublime by using original compositions of the 
peripathetic rhetorical practice and Platonic ideas on intuition and beauty 
to bring about a new reception theory with a unique literary technique 
(Malm 2000: 1–10; Usher 2007: 2892–303). The sublime appeared as the 
manifestation and result of the interplay of congenial and great thoughts, 
strong emotions, rhetorical modes, artistic performance, and an elevated 
style. The way Longinus unites the Platonic interpretation and the rhetor-
ical technique of the genus sublime, thus constructing a new meaning for 
the sublime, is indispensable to understand the transformation of the con-
cept from a purely rhetorical to a more imaginative and affective notion 
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(for examples of the literary compilation technique in order to achieve the 
sublime aesthetic effect, see Longinus, On the Sublime, 11–16).
In a similar fashion to his Greek contemporaries, Longinus relied on 
peripathetic and Platonic thoughts on artistic creation (Innes 2002: 259–
284). With respect to the ideas of greatness, beauty, affection and partly 
perfection, Longinus dwelt on the idea of harmony with respect to sublim-
ity (Longinus 1991: cap. I–II.). It is also one of the primary propositions of 
Kant as well concerning the interplay of imagination and cognition. Plato, 
when discussing poetic and rhetorical truth, rejects mimesis on ethical and 
ontological grounds. However, not entirely: those artistic forms which are 
nearest to the abstract ideas they represent and are thereby based on the 
invention (heuresis) of eternal and universal principles, are ethically accept-
able. As for art, music and poetry, and subsequently, beauty and harmony 
(sublimity is not distinguished from beauty in early Greek thought) had to 
have a constant or fixed point of reference. If they are capable of represent-
ing the eidos, the universal concept in each and every phenomenon, then 
they are nearer to the idea (Plato, Republic 475d–476b, Symposium 210e²3).
In addition, Plato revered Homer, recognised the power in his poetry, 
which he attributed to the fact that the master managed to attain Beauty, 
which is a constant principle only accessible to philosophers, and to one 
who can imperviously lead the souls wherever he wants (psychagogy). This 
most affective ability is not residing in the eidos, it is not eidetic beauty, 
though it has to meet certain prescribed measures not to appear mean or 
fustian. The affective force is subsequently not resulting from them. In the 
Platonic dialogue, Ion, Socrates derives this ability of Ion from divine or-
igins (Plato, Ion 536a). It is not techné that makes Ion a magnetic musi-
cian and actor (rhapsodos), but his enthusiasm (enthusiasmos). Therefore, the 
enthusiastic rhapsodos unites the eidetic and non-eidetic elements of sub-
lime art by intuitive identification, by his moving emotions and the terrible 
manifestations of his imagination in a harmonious way that makes him at-
tractive to the audience (Plato, Ion 534c-d). In turn, if an artistic creation 
or phenomenon meets this principle, which nevertheless retains an aspect 
2 For Platonic works I only indicated the section markers without the page numbers because 
in many cases certain themes recur at different parts of the section. For the references of the 
dialogues see Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Plato: the Collected Dialogues (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961); Allan Bloom, ed. and trans., The Republic of Plato 
(New York: Basic Books, 1991).
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that cannot be fully comprehended, then that artwork or object attains a 
perfect affective power to the human mind. It is also a source and explana-
tion residing within the affective power of the Kantian sublime which has 
its origins in classical conceptions of the sublime, reinterpreted and trans-
mitted by Longinus.
Notwithstanding this theoretical refinement, Kant also had a direct 
source and fore-runner in the mid-18th-century treatise of the Irish philos-
opher, historian, and politician, Edmund Burke. Burke also distinguished 
the sublime from beauty, since he thought that sublime is an external 
objective quality which is reflected in its effects, and can be recognised 
through these effects. In his essay, Burke provides an “objective” natural 
spectroscopy among which one can distinguish categories and aesthetic 
judgments directed by our Taste. The most common causes of the sub-
lime according to his wide view are: obscurity, the idea of power, vacuity, 
darkness, solitude, silence, infinity, nature, large objects, and uniformity 
(Burke, Enquiry, Part I, 2, 3–23).³4In addition, sublime comes with the 
feeling of terror, astonishment and reverence: “Indeed, terror is in all cas-
es whatsoever, either more openly or latently, the ruling principle of the 
sublime” (Burke, Enquiry, 2, 2.). He also states that “astonishment is that 
state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree 
of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that 
it cannot entertain any other, not by consequence reason on that object 
which employs it” (Burke, Enquiry, 2, 1.) For Burke sublime can also be 
an imitation of a great talent in literary works of art that have effects, such 
as astonishment, admiration, and grandeur, similar to natural phenomena 
(Burke, Enquiry, Part V, 1–6.). Therefore to copy and compete with a geni-
us appears as an ambition in order to create something original: imitation 
is thus anti-mimetic, or, more precisely, mimetic and non-mimetic at the 
same time, which results in a creative (re)thinking of artistic expression. 
As it has been pointed out, this idea was basically entertained by Plato 
and subsequently Longinus when discussing the artistry of the enthusiastic 
rhapsodos.
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Immanuel Kant discussed the 
sublime as being different from beauty, since sublimity incites strong emo-
tions, respect and fear from the spectator, but at the same time, it gives de-
3  In the case of Burke’s work, the Arabic numbers refer to chapters and subchapters.
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light and joy. It points beyond the sensuous world, reaching out to infinity. 
Human beings are capable of perceiving either sublime objects, such as the 
ocean, or a huge mountain, (mathematical sublime), or sublime forces, such 
as a storm, or a volcano (dynamical sublime). During the latter process, our 
imagination arrives at a disharmony with cognition (judgment), since the 
cognitive part tries to reach totality, attempts to grasp reality in its entire-
ty, but is in-capable of receiving the sublime as a whole (as the sublime 
is infinite and affective). In the former case, the “collapse” of cognition 
enables us only to conceptualise the object as a mathematical progression 
without being able to imagine it, and it leads to the certainty of ideas. That 
is precisely the reason why Kant contrasted sublimity with beauty: beauty 
is always framed and finite and it can be grasped with our understanding. 
As for the sublime, it is unintelligible, since it cannot be conceptualised, 
yet one elevates the idea of the totality of one’s own mind over the sen-
sation of the sublime (and the source of one’s joy). Thus, human beings 
transcend themselves over nature, being aware that they are superior to it 
and its phenomena, as they are free to elevate themselves beyond sublimity 
(Kant 2000: §23–28, passim.) The aesthetics of the sublime can have sub-
sequently no conceptual framework. Language can never make it wholly 
intelligible and communicable, according to Kant, since only conceptual 
thoughts can be explicated and communicated. Consequently, one needs 
intuition and imagination to decipher sublime aesthetics through poetry or 
art. Kant adds that sublime aesthetics:
is very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature 
out of the material which the real one gives it […] it is 
really the art of poetry in which the faculty of aesthetic 
ideas can reveal itself in its full measure […] give imagi-
nation an impetus to think more, although in an unde-
veloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, 
and hence in a determinate linguistic expression. (Kant 
2000: 192–93 [§49])
Though Burke’s ideas on the sources of the sublime are the primary sourc-
es for Kant as well, Burke’s empirical interpretation strongly differs from 
Kant’s ideas on reflective aesthetic judgments, which are metaphysical in 
their nature. In the Kantian sublime there is a conflict between judgment 
and imagination within the sublime, wherein imagination cannot articu-
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late the desire of the totality of the judgment. The imbalance, the lack of 
harmony in the mind between imagination and judgment is solved so that 
judgment raises the mind to a level of abstract freedom where it can face 
with nature as a totality and finally overcome it, thus creating a balance 
between imagination and cognition. Consequently, a considerable differ-
ence lies in the fact that for Kant the sublime is only present in the mind, 
and it is far from being an objective empirical quality as it is for Burke.
However, at the same time, it is quite obvious that poetic or artistic acts 
imply constructedness, that is, techné. As it has been explained so far, the 
role of techné in sublimity is as old as the tradition of the sublime itself. 
Plato’s Ion points towards non-rhetoric, non-eidetic origins of the sublime 
along with the already existing rhetorical tradition. Socrates was explaining 
to Ion that divine poetic powers are gifted to the poet, channelled through 
his art while the poet is inspired and filled with holy awe (enthusiasmos). 
On the contrary, the rhetorical interpretation of the sublime style (genus 
grande) views the sublime as an effect raised by the orator through the re-
fined and systematic application of figures and tropes (schemata dianoeias et 
lexeos).
In order to endeavour to explicate this duality of the nature of the 
sublime, and to argue for the hypothesis put forward in the introduc-
tion, namely, that the affective scope of the sublime began to expand in 
18th-century British aesthetics, it is worth looking at a different interpreta-
tion of the epistemological and ontological problem posed by the sublime. 
In order to provide further reinforcement to my argument, it is now worth 
revisiting the treatise of Longinus.
Longinus originates the sublime from five sources that arise from phy-
sis (tendency toward elevated thought or enthusiastic pathos — the latter is 
also a Platonic idea), or from techné (schemata dianoeias and lexeos, that is, 
tropes and figures; phrasis, and synthesis) (Longinus 1991: Section 7). The 
hypothesis for the latter group of sources is that words are harmoniously 
allocated like musical notes in a congenial composition. And since harmo-
ny is innate to human beings, if it meets the former preconditions of physis, 
it has the effect of touching the soul (Longinus 1991: Section 39). Phy-
sis and techné are subsequently necessarily supplementary. Besides Plato, 
Longinus dwells on the peripathetic rhetorical tradition that had gradually 
developed in Greek rhetoric since Gorgias and Aristotle, which assumes 
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that techné, literally conceived, also arises from nature (phainen). This idea 
repeats the original theory of mimesis by Aristotle (Aristotle, Physics, Book 
B: 194a).⁴5Therefore, Longinus thinks that only art can reveal nature, but 
at the same time art conceals itself through techné: physis disappears. Na-
ture loves to conceal itself (physis kruptesthai philei) is a thought attributed 
to Heraclitus in the classical tradition. In addition, every art is limited in 
the sense that it transforms physis into a ‘static form’. Presentation appears 
as knowledge (mathésis) but a knowledge that is inherently limited, while 
great art requires great talent (genius). However, according to Longinus, 
even a genius must rely on art:
Nature supplies the first main underlying elements in 
all cases, but study enables one to define the right mo-
ment and appropriate measure on each occasion, and 
also provides steady training and practice. […] Great 
qualities are too precarious when left to themselves, un-
steadied and unballasted by knowledge, abandoned to 
mere impulse and untutored daring; they need the bri-
dle as well as the spur. Demosthenes shows that this is 
true in everyday life when he says that while the greatest 
blessing is good fortune, the second, no less important, is 
good counsel, and that the absence of the second utterly 
destroys the first. We might apply it to literature, with 
talent in the place of fortune and art in that of counsel. 
The clinching proof is that only by means of art can we 
perceive the fact that certain literary effects are due to 
sheer inborn talent. If, as I said, those who object to lit-
erary criticism would ponder these things, they would, I 
think, no longer consider the investigation of our subject 
extravagant or useless (Longinus 1991: Section 2, 5.)
If sublime art is the achievement of the genius whose art is based on techné 
as a development out of nature, then the question arises how it is actually 
achieved. The Longinian idea implies that the genius elevates his art by 
4 For the works of Aristotle I only indicated the section and caput markers without the page 
numbers because in many cases certain themes recur at different parts of the section. For the 
references see The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 
1941).
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imitation (mimesis) and emulation (zélotis). But even this mimesis is not 
a technical one. It is rather something “mysterious” like a contagion. This 
idea is taken up by Kant when he discusses that the essence with which the 
genius vests art cannot be transmitted, it is unique because it does not rest 
on any concept (and only conceptual phenomena are communicable). The 
genius is not acting on rational grounds when creating art (Kant 2000: 
186–97). Mimesis of the congenial art is subsequently non-mimetic, it is 
not imitation (Nachahmung), but creative rethinking of the heritage with 
the elements of inheritance (Nachfolge) (Kant 2000: 162–164). Kant also 
adds that the disciple needs to meet the original sources again that the 
genius originally used, and at the same time it has to learn the mode of 
availing himself of these sources (Kant 2000: 186–191). It is rather agon-
ic competition, the engine of which, according to Longinus, is impression 
by ethos (apotypòsis), for instance, a beautiful plastic artwork, or a good 
performance. Though in great art techné is an ally to nature, it is different 
in the case of the beautiful, where it is perfection and harmonious resem-
blance to humans (eidetic beauty), and in the case of the sublime, where it 
rather rests on logos, on non-eidetic origins. In this latter instance, tech-
né works best if it is concealed from view, wherein physis is allowed to be 
presented as natural pathos (Longinus 1991: Section 35). The logos of the 
sublime is thus a true logos, since it unveils. But it also needs delicacy, dis-
guise which is the very essence of veiling the unveiled (dialanthané). And 
the tool for disguise is the shining or light of the figure (dèlon oti tô phôti 
autô). As Longinus points out:
We should not here omit, dear friend, though we shall 
deal with it very briefly, a subject we have studied, name-
ly, that figures naturally reinforce greatness and are won-
derfully supported by it in turn. I shall explain why and 
how this happens. The cunning use of figures arouses a 
peculiar suspicion in the hearer’s mind, a feeling of being 
deliberately trapped and misled. This occurs when we are 
addressing a single judge with power of decision, and es-
pecially a dictator, a king, or an eminent leader. He is 
easily angered by the thought that he is being outwitted 
like a silly child by the expert speaker’s pretty figures; he 
sees in the fallacious reasoning a personal insult; some-
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times he may altogether give way to savage exasperation, 
but even if he controls his anger he remains impervious 
to persuasion. 
That is why the best use of a figure is when the very fact 
that it is a figure goes unnoticed. Now greatness and 
passion are a wonderful help and protection against the 
suspicions aroused by the use of figures; cunning tech-
niques, when overlaid with beauty and passion, dis-
appear from view and escape all further suspicion. [...] 
How has an orator there concealed the figure? Clearly, 
by its very brilliance. Just as dimmer lights are lost in the 
surrounding sunshine, so pervading grandeur all around 
obscures the presence of rhetorical devices. Something 
not very different happens in painting: light and shade 
are represented by colors on the same plane, yet the light 
is seen first, it not only stands out but seems much near-
er. In the same way, great and passionate expressions af-
fect our minds more closely; by a kind of natural kinship 
and brilliance they are seen before the figures, whose art-
istry they overshadow and keep hidden (Longinus 1991: 
Section 17, 29).
Therefore, on the basis of what has been said so far, the sublime can be 
interpreted as shining — the “truth” of great art, the appearance of its ra-
diance (phainesthai dia laprotèta). But the real essence of art remains cryp-
tical, since light casts it into the shadow (ekphanestaton). In addition, the 
“Longinian shining” or light metaphors are supplemented by heliotropes 
in the sense Jacques Derrida refers to them (Derrida 1982: 207–271). It is 
pointed out in one of the studies of Jacques Derrida that heliotropism is one 
of those deep undercurrents in Western philosophy that constantly return 
in diverse forms. One might also add that in cultural representations as 
well. Sun and sunlight metaphors, such as tropes of light, brilliance, and 
resplendence, all imply a metaphysical assumption of vision as well. Thus, 
I think, the sublime can also be seen as a transmitter, a channel, or, at the 
very least, an intermittent dimension, but at the same time a gateway as 
well, through which a nonrepresentational quality and a prohibition, crys-
tallised in the inscription, could be played out. Therefore, the sublime not 
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only unites tropes of light and shadow, but also poses a possibility of prob-
lematising ontological and epistemological limits and non-limits (Nancy 
1984: 76–103). Longinus sees Homer writing the Odyssey as a setting sun 
(Longinus 1991: Section 9). He also refers to the Book of Genesis (‘Fiat 
lux!’), as an instance of pure epiphany (Longinus 1991: Section 9).
However, this shining has to be sought for, needs to be cleared. The mo-
tive power hereby is human yearning: nature implanted in us the ability of 
contemplations and the urge to rival our predecessors, the yearning that 
cannot be overcome (érôs) for great things, for the divine beyond the earth-
ly realm (daimoniôteron) (Longinus 1991: Section 35). Thus humans are, 
as Lacoue-Labarthe argues, “metaontic”, “metacosmic beings” (Lacoue-La-
barthe – Kuchta 1991: 225). The source of astonishment or terror when 
sublime emerges is this very clarification, the unveiling of our transcend-
ence beyond finite and rational limitations. The essence of the sublime is 
subsequently “beyond the light”, and is in turn in contrast to beauty as 
appearance.⁵6
Consequently, in a philosophical sense it is plausible to argue for this 
aspect of terror in the sublime as a valid source of insight into truth or in 
the case of art, into its essence. And even if the sublime does not lead to 
“truth” in any conceptually conceived way, still it conveys a presentation of 
the unpresentable, thus validating and consolidating non-rational ways of 
attaining knowledge of human existence. In my opinion, this is what Guy 
Sircello summarized in the relation under the terms of epistemological and 
ontological transcendence. Nevertheless, as it has been shown, the Longinian 
basis holds a very similar proposition as partly repeated and reinterpreted 
in Burke’s and Kant’s theories: a larger scheme which serves as a representa-
tion of the unity of terror, fear, pity and joy on a deeper, half-subconscious 
level (sub-limen — i.e. below the threshold). Thus, this seems to answer the 
problem of epistemological transcendence: the reality of the sub-limen cannot 
be perceived directly (non-real), hence an invention of the reality of the 
sublime becomes possible in the human mind. Consequently, using Sircel-
5 For a further elucidation of how veiling and unveiling functions concerning the presentation 
of the unpresentable, and the non-rational ways of attaining knowledge of human existence 
see Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Martin Heidegger, Poetry, 
Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Colophon, 1971), 17-87; 
Martin Heidegger, The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell Krell, vol. 1. Nietzsche (New 
York: Harper, 1979), 80, 109-10.
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lo’s concept again, the ontological transcendence opens up a vista for gaining 
an aesthetic though valid knowledge of the world.
Nonetheless, the result poststructuralist aesthetics arrives at — radical 
openness — is in my view insufficient as a critical concept, or at the very 
least, lacks refinement because it does not say anything about the sublime 
itself, it only reflects on a potential repercussion of its epistemology. As has 
been pointed out earlier, the critical notion of Bertens is neither novel, nor 
is it a meticulously elaborated concept. Perhaps this is not even simply se-
mantics or the question of a more elaborate philological and philosophical 
analysis: the existence of sublimity and our perception of it reflect some-
thing of the transcendental realities in great art that eventually and per-
haps for our sake remain unveiled in our human life.
However, these considerations had their origins in early 18th-century Brit-
ish aesthetics. The sublime of Longinus inspired many generations of phi-
losophers, orators, and writers from the late Roman to modern times. The 
work of Longinus had been known in England since the mid-17th century, 
as it was translated into Latin by two English authors (Langbaine 1636, 
Hall 1652).⁶7In the preface to his translation, John Hall emphasized the 
psychological, elevated, divine, and inspirational qualities of the sublime.
Nevertheless, more frequent allusions to the sublime appeared only af-
ter 1674 when Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux’s work on Longinus (Traité du 
sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours traduit du grec de Longin) was 
translated into English. French literary debates on the notion of sublimity 
also influenced early 18th-century British literary critics, who elaborated on 
the conceptualisation of the sublime so as to gradually transform it from 
its original, narrower and stricter rhetorical interpretation towards a more 
imaginative and empiricist psychological aesthetic category. Thus, the early 
18th-century concept of the sublime developed towards that aesthetic con-
cept which finally became the major source of terror in the aesthetic theory 
of Burke and later authors. It is therefore essential to note that the Kantian 
and Burkean ideas of greatness and astonishment in the aesthetics of the 
sublime had a very firm source in the 18th-century classicist literary and 
rhetorical tradition.
6 Editio princeps in England: Gerard Langbaine (Oxford, 1636); first English translation by 
John Hall: Peri Hypsous, or Dionysius Longinus of the Height of Eloquence rendered out of the 
originall by J. Hall Esq. (1652). Republications: 1698, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1733, 1743, 1752.
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Although the late 17th-century French literary debate and its English re-
ception signalled a reinvigoration of the theory of the sublime, it did not 
lose its deeply rooted classical origins. In my view, this is also shown by 
the tendency that, on the one hand, changes in 18th-century English in-
terpretations of the sublime ran parallel to the altering interpretations of 
the work of Longinus. On the other hand, this process of aesthetic inter-
pretation was neatly connected to the main tenets of British empiricism as 
well. With respect to periodisation, it can be plausibly argued that from 
Boileau’s reception to the mid-18th century the sublime was gradually 
transformed from a more formal, structural and rhetorical mode towards a 
psychological and empiricist, imaginative, less literary and more sensation-
al one (Monk 1960: 1–62). Within this process passion, enthusiasm and 
astonishment obtained higher values. As B. H. Bronson pointed out, “[s]
ublimity is constantly in the thought of Dennis and his contemporaries, 
made vividly aware of Longinus by Boileau” (Bronson 1967: 18.). The sub-
lime is a most prevalent concept used in defense of the irregular and the 
unbounded as well.
Alexander Pope, the ‘national critic’ and the author of An Essay on Crit-
icism (1711) gained huge popularity and plaudits in a relatively short pe-
riod. The Catholic and Tory leader of the Martinus Scriblerus Club (John 
Gay, Dr. John Arbuthnot, Thomas Parnell, and Jonathan Swift among the 
members) became an arbiter elegantiae besides Addison and Shaftesbury 
in the early 18th century. It is not by chance that Samuel Johnson praises 
Pope’s style which “exhibits every mode of excellence that can embellish or 
dignify composition  – selection of matter, novelty of arrangement, justness 
of precept, splendour of illustration, and propriety of digression” (Johnson 
quoted by Fairer, 1989: 25). I argue that Pope’s views on the sublime can 
be understood only by interpreting his thoughts on literary taste simulta-
neously. It is John Dennis, whom Pope saw as a bad critic, who ‘provoked’ 
the writing of a theory of art and literary criticism in a poetic form (Rogers 
1975: 29). The Essay imitated Horace’s Ars poetica.
Pope formed his judgements of taste according to two key concepts (for 
the forerunners of Pope with regard to this, see Fairer 1989: 34–36). Man-
ners is the skill of distinguishing between good and bad, which ideally 
aims to create a humorous, tolerant and perceptive rapport, the ‘great man-
ner’. He discusses it in the Essay as follows: 
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Be niggards of advice on no pretence;
For the worst avarice is that of sense.
With mean complaisance ne’ev betray your trust,
Nor be so civil as to prove unjust.
Fear not the anger of the wise to raise;
Those best can bear reproof who merit praise. (lines 
578–583)⁷8
In this respect, Pope adhered to the intentions of the Club, since all of its 
members took pains to establish an educated public discourse, in which 
artistic performances could be judged and assessed according to exact as-
pects governed by a refined taste. The other source of judgements of taste 
is the ability to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly. This ability 
also helps the critic to compare works of art on the basis of understanding 
the cultural context and the artistic intention. Consequently, Pope thinks 
that one has to strive for universality when forming judgements of taste so 
that Truth (in the sense of natural law) could be revealed. The uncovering 
of truth, however, is a personal, human and at the same time moral obliga-
tion as well, and not an abstraction or metaphysical finiteness:  
Learn then what Morals Criticks ought to show,
For ’tis but half a Judge’s Task, to Know.
’tis not enough, Taste, Judgement, Learning, join;
In all you speak, let Truth and Candor shine:
That not alone what to your Sense is due,
All may allow; but seek your Friendship too. (560–565)
In addition, because of their universality, these judgements have to be 
based upon sense and naturalness. According to Pope, sense is a moderate 
form of understanding, which also has decorum:
’Tis hard to say, if greater Want of Skill
Appear in Writing or in Judging ill;
But, of the two, less dang’rous is th’ Offence,
To tire our Patience, than mis-lead our Sense:
Some few in that, but Numbers err in this,
7 The paper’s quotations, referring to lines, are derived from the following edition: Pope, 
Alexander: An Essay on Criticism, in Butt, John (ed.): Alexander Pope’s Collected Poems, 
London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1965, 180-215. 
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Ten Censure wrong for one who Writes amiss;
A Fool might once himself alone expose,
Now One in Verse makes many more in Prose. (1–7)
Ratio as opposed to the vacuity of mind and the lack of erudition, which 
has to harmonise with artistic expression and is part of critical intelligence, 
but at the same time it is poignant and sensible:
Pride, where Wit fails, steps in to our Defence,
And fills up all the mighty Void of Sense!
[…]
Some dryly plain, without Invention’s Aid,
Write dull Receits, how Poems may be made:
These leave the Sense, their Learning to display,
And those explain the Meaning quite away. (209–210; 
114–117)
If taste is refined in due accordance with the principles of the art of poet-
ics, precision and decorum with the help of Sense, then, as Andrew Sand-
ers also argues, style impresses with the sensation of naturalness (Sanders 
1996: 287–289).
The essence of nature is invisible, can only be witnessed in its manifes-
tations, and it sets limitations to talent within which one’s lore can be per-
fected by art. Pope interprets Nature as divine force (l. 68–73), and as the 
cosmos itself, the order, symmetry and harmony of which the work of art 
must imitate and reflect (l. 74–87) (for further details of the complexity of 
the concept of nature in the 18th century, see Lovejoy 1960). By its internal, 
lively essence, Nature is the opposite of “artificiality” and at the same time, 
the source of inspiration, while art provides those forms into which this 
inspiration could diffuse and create beauty: 
In Wit, as Nature, what affects our Hearts
Is not th’ Exactness of peculiar Parts;
’Tis not a Lip, or Eye, we Beauty call,
But the joint Force and full Result of all. (243–246)
Even if the Essay is the “handbook of Augustan orthodoxy” (Bronson, 
1967: 18), Pope, in a timely manner, corrects the seemingly rigid notions 
attributed to nature by moving between great wits and less gentler forms 
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of Nature. It can be noted that Pope’s “pathetic tenderness” (Bronson 
1967: 20) provides for full-fledged extravagancies and lovely descriptions 
of a gentler Nature in “Windsor Forest” (1704) (Bronson, 1967: 18–21). 
Therefore, it can also be argued that Pope also swings in a stream of early 
18th-century heterogeneous interpretations of sublimity from finer ones de-
rived from a crisp and grand style to those that spring from wild nature’s 
affective force of awe and terror, even if he mostly represents the peripa-
thetic tradition within. Artistic intention, naturalness and creative force 
are therefore sine qua nons; however, similarly to Horace, Pope allows for 
minor mistakes in case of the genius, thus enabling licence (licentia):
If, where the Rules not far enough extend,
(Since Rules where made but to promote their End)
Some Lucky Licence answers to the full
Th’ Intent propos’d that Licence is a Rule.
Thus Pegasus, a nearer way to take,
May boldly deviate from the common Track.
Great Wits sometimes may gloriously offend,
And rise to Faults true Criticks dare not mend;
From vulgar Bounds with brave Disorder part,
And snatch a Grace beyond the Reach of Art,
Which, without passing thro’ the Judgment, gains
The Heart, and all its End at once attains. (146–155)
The great thought of Longinos, which inspires sublime, is coupled with 
Wit on the wings of Pegasus. Yet, it can rarely soar:
True Ease in Writing comes from Art, not Chance,
As those move easiest who have learn’d to dance,
’Tis not enough no harshness gives Offence,
The Sound must seem an Eccho to the Sense.
Soft is the Strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth Stream in smoother Numbers flows;
But when loud urges lash the sounding Shore,
The hoarse, rough Verse shou’d like the Torrent roar. 
(362–369)
This swiftly and elegantly moving sublimity is joined with Sweetness and 
Light (11–16), Candor and Truth (562–563), as well as Ease. Pope also 
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lists the opposites of these qualities: meanness and witlessness 36–41); lack 
of independence, avarice, the platitudinous and the untrue (566–583). 
What is more, he often plays with light, if he discusses the clear, grand and 
sublime style or criticism, and thus represents the requisites of clarity met-
aphorically as well:
But true Expression, like the’, unchanging Sun,
Clears and improves whate’ev it shines upon,
It gilds all Objects, but it alters none. (315–317)
The poet transforms the negative ‘downward pressure’ of rules into positive 
‘compression’. His concentrated energy moves between the poles of con-
traction and release. Hence, sublimity is manifested in the grand style, and 
only poetic Wit is able to reach true Sublime, the par excellence examples 
of which the author finds in the works of masters of classical antiquity 
with their perceived universal validity. Moreover, Pope elaborates on the 
idea of universal values in his later work of moral philosophy, An Essay on 
Man (1733–1734). In this work, Man is represented as a part of the all-per-
vasive harmony of the order of nature, which binds every creature accord-
ing to the principle of the “great chain of Being” with God at its end. It is 
also characteristic of Pope and his age’s poetry that Man is at the centre of 
urban satirisation, too:
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan,
The proper study of mankind is man.
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the sceptic side,
With too much weakness for the stoic’s pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;
In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast;
In doubt his mind or body to prefer;
Born but to die, and reasoning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confused;
Still by himself abused or disabused;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
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Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl’d:
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world! (Epistle II, Argu-
ment, 1–15 quoted in Hollander 1973)
Furthermore, in almost all cases, these interpretations originate from the 
Longinian philological tradition with their wide-ranging allusions, from 
which the limits of this paper enabled only a few to be examined. Moreo-
ver, Pope explicitly praises Longinos:
Thee, bold Longinus! all the Nine inspire,
And bless, their Critick with a Poet’s Fire
An ardent Judge, who Zealous in his Trust,
With Warmth gives Sentence, yet is always Just;
Whose own Example strengthens all his Laws,
And Is himself that great Sublime he draws. (675–680)
What is more, this line ends a beautiful series of enkomions, praising 
Horace (653–664), Dionysius Halicarnasseus (665–666), Petronius (667–
680), and Quintilianus (669–674). Finally, the poet crowns this with his 
own critical standpoint (719–746). In sum, Pope belongs to that group of 
critics who interpret the sublime as a rhetoric category which needs erudi-
tion and refined taste (the peripathetic tradition of the sublime), follow-
ing the classical model of the urban sublime by Horace and Cicero, thus 
constituting the category of the urban sublime (sublimitas urbana). Most 
of Pope’s contemporaries tended to shift the interpretation of the sublime 
towards a more empiricist and psychological basis. Yet, Pope belongs to 
that stream of literary aesthetics of neoclassicism, which springs from a 
wide spectrum of sensibility. This stream brings about heterogeneous inter-
pretations of sublimity, including finer ones derived from a crisp and grand 
style. Pope provides a par excellence example of what he meant by the genus 
sublime, positioning himself as the spearhead of this tradition, inspiring 
others in his wake.
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